The nearly 70-year-old transatlantic partnership has often endured periods of turbulence. Today, however, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) seems to be facing a more fundamental crisis that puts into question its very existence. Is this widespread perception accurate? What makes this crisis different than others? Will NATO survive this crisis as it has done in the past? What will the mid- and long-term future of transatlantic relations look like?

AN EVOLVING AND ADAPTABLE INSTITUTION
Why Was NATO Created and Why It Survived the End of the Cold War

NATO was created in 1949 as a military alliance to ensure that war would never plague Europe again.1 As the World War II alliance with the Soviet Union crumbled, the United States quickly recognized three key challenges to peace in Europe. Firstly, Europe’s economy was in shambles, cities destroyed and resources all but depleted. If the resulting socio-economic problems were allowed to spiral out of control—as happened in the interwar period—political instability could threaten peace. This problem was tackled by the European Recovery Plan (ERP)—also known as the “Marshall Plan”—that injected millions of dollars into European economies to jump-start reconstruction and avoid food shortages. Secondly, there was a Soviet need for security that took forms highly out of step with the principles declared in the 1941 Atlantic Charter or the 1945 United Nations declaration. Between 1945 and 1948, Stalin moved to subjugate Eastern Europe transforming Poland, Bulgaria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Yugoslavia and the occupied zone in Eastern Germany into satellite states. Divided Germany became the highly militarized border between the Western and Eastern “blocs”. Britain and France feared that Stalin’s expansionism may not stop there and were adamant that the only effective deterrent would be for the United States to remain involved indefinitely in the European security system. This “invitation” formed the basis of the 1948 Brussels Treaty—that created the Western European Union (WEU)—and the 1949 NATO Treaty. The third challenge was Germany. Through two world wars European leaders had learned to fear a strong Germany. The Marshall Plan would help West German reconstruction but many in Europe thought it would also risk reviving German industrial strength and, in the long-term, its military ambitions. When NATO was created in 1949 it was meant to deter the Soviet Union as much as the revival of a strong German industrial-military-complex. In the famous words of NATO’s first Secretary, Lord H. L. Ismay, the Alliance was to “keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down.”2
Clearly enough, in 2018 the main premises for NATO’s existence have disappeared. Germany is no longer a military threat. It is the leading democratic power in the European Union (EU), which created economic ties so strong among European nations to render the idea of an intra-European war an absurd thought. Germany has also been one of the most trusted transatlantic partners for successive presidents up to Barack Obama. The Soviet Union collapsed as far back as 1991 leaving behind an economically weak—and until recently military unprepared—Russia. Despite the recent Russian military modernisation and build-up and the widespread perception of Russia as a rising threat, the combined military spending of France and Germany dwarves Russia’s. Thus, why do Europe and the United States still need NATO? At a time, in which US President Donald Trump seems to think that the US commitment to NATO is not worth the price, one should take an objective and historically informed look at what value the organization has brought and continues to bring to the US.

During the Cold War, the US guaranteed peace in Europe at great financial cost. But it received in return immense benefits too—politically, economically, financially, and militarily. American access to fast-growing European markets was one result of this designed commitment. Stable, friendly, and prosperous European nations strengthened both economically and ideologically the global world order based on free-trade that American policy-makers had created in 1945 to advance American interests. It was trade with European nations and their dependence on the US dollar that allowed the American GDP to grow continuously. Today still, trade with the EU accounts for 20% of the American GDP, and the combined US-EU GPD totals to 60% of the world’s GDP. Needless to say, the sheer volume of this trade partnership generates hundreds of thousands of jobs on both sides of the Atlantic. Keeping European nations prosperous but militarily dependent on American power also ensured American global military dominance. This dominance also resulted in every NATO nation turning to US technology and weapons to equip their troops generating a perennial source of revenues. It was also thanks to NATO that the United States could become the world’s only hegemonic power after the collapse of the Soviet Union to which Western European trade with Eastern European countries contributed a great deal.

NATO proved very resilient even when many predicted its necessary demise. Shortly after the Berlin Wall fell, many predicted that absent the Soviet threat, NATO would cease to be an effective alliance. Kenneth Waltz, in testimony before the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee in November 1990 argued that NATO was “a disappearing thing.” What Waltz and others failed to appreciate was how NATO, by 1991, was far from just a military defensive alliance. It had already transformed into a vehicle and symbol of shared transatlantic policies, norms, and values. NATO today defines itself as “a unique community of values committed to the principles of individual liberty, democracy, human rights and the rule of law.” But one might argue that this was already the case in 1991. NATO had also been a successful organization—it had won the Cold War and supervised Europe’s “long peace.” Why create new institutions or regimes to deal with new problems – many thought – when NATO could be adapted to do exactly that? Others believed that the collapse of the Soviet Union did not mean necessarily the end of security threats in the mid-long-term. Former Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, for instance, famously quipped, “You don’t cancel your home insurance policy just because there have been fewer burglaries on your street in the last 12 months!” The idea was that NATO would remain an essential source of stability in an unpredictable world. President Bush’ support for the
continuation of NATO, German ambition to join NATO as a united nation, and the important role NATO military commands played in the first Gulf War did the rest. Hence, after 1991 NATO adapted and expanded both vertically (new tasks) and horizontally (new members). The concept of a defensive alliance was converted into a concept of collective security. In four successive “Strategic Concepts”, NATO broadened its definition of security to recognize the importance of political, economic, social and environmental factors in addition to the defense/deterrence dimension. It identified the new risks that had emerged since the end of the Cold War, which included terrorism, ethnic conflict, human rights abuses, political instability, economic fragility, and the spread of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and their means of delivery. After 9/11 the Alliance extended its reach even further. Today’s strategic concept defines NATO as having three essential core tasks: collective defense, crisis management, and cooperative security. As a result of these adaptations, in the 1990s and 2000s NATO was busier than ever. It has been involved in Kosovo, Kuwait, Rwanda, Libya, Iraq, Afghanistan often pursuing not only security but also moral goals in an attempt to promote Western values. For better or worse, NATO has become a truly global institution that may oppose any aggressive conduct—interpreted as a threat to the peaceful international order—anywhere in the world. Many of the original benefits that NATO brought to the US continue to exist also. NATO is a force multiplier that grants the US access to the industrial and military capabilities of France, Britain and Germany, which combined outpace any non-US military power. This includes access to these countries’ significant intelligence capabilities that contribute greatly to US intelligence efforts. NATO promotes Western (i.e. American) values in regions of the world that have long been considered of national security interest. NATO supports EU economies that are essential to US trade and American citizens’ standard of living. For better or worse, US military bases in Europe continue to guarantee US access to the Mediterranean and the Middle-East and have allowed the international liberal order and its humanitarian values to be promoted through regime change in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and the Balkans. It is also worth pointing out how the only time “Article V” was invoked was in the aftermath of 9/11. There, the European allies coalesced with the United States in support of its war on Afghanistan. And since then, NATO nations have also been the main partner in the fight against international terrorism. This is why eleven US presidents and thirty-five US Congresses have supported NATO. This is why NATO was able to overcome numerous crisis and survive the collapse of the Soviet Union.

NOTHING NEW UNDER THE SUN?
Crises, Burden-Sharing, and President Trump’s Battle of the Numbers

In November 2016, the people of the United States elected a president—Donald Trump—who does not recognize not only the value of NATO as an organization—which he has defined “obsolete”—but also the value of the transatlantic economic, political, and military partnership as a whole as well as the international liberal order it promotes. In fact, Trump challenged that global order that the United States engineered and endured to maintain for over 70 years. Once in office, European defense spending and EU exports have become Trump’s focus of attention. These two grievances seem to be somehow connected in Trump’s world view. Trump accused European nations to
free-ride on their security at great cost for the United States while at the same time enjoying the prosperity that derives from the trade surplus the EU maintains on the United States. “We are spending a fortune on military in order to lose $800 billion in trade losses. That doesn’t sound very smart to me,” the president said in a completely misleading characterization of US trade deficit. Trump went as far as to call the European Union a “foe” for “what they do to us is in trade.” The US and the EU came close to a trade war as the administration imposed high tariffs on European steel and aluminum and even ventilated that it might do the same on automobiles. To this, the EU responded with increased tariffs on some American goods, including Harley-Davidson motorcycles. Trump also pointed his finger at Germany’s economic relations with Russia on energy matters. In particular, Trump criticized the Nord Stream 2 pipeline project that is due to increase gas streams to Germany and Western Europe but bypass Eastern European countries. “They want us to protect them against Russia, and yet they pay billions of dollars to Russia, and we’re the schmucks paying for the whole thing,” the president boasted.

Trump’s attacks on trade went hand in hand with complaints about NATO-Europe’s deficient military spending [Fig. 1]. Trump like many presidents before him would like for the allies to spend more on defense, but his hostile rhetoric is unprecedented. “They’ve really taken advantage of us, and many of those countries are in NATO and they weren’t paying their bills.” In order to fuel this idea President Trump portrayed NATO as having some sort of a single, collective, and comprehensive defense budget to which every member contributes, which is incorrect. He even went as far as arguing that Germany “owes vast sums of money to NATO, and the United States must be paid more for the powerful, and very expensive, defense it provides.” However, this is not how NATO budget works. Direct financial contributions to NATO budget by member countries are set in accordance with an agreed cost-sharing formula based on Gross National Income (GNI). This form of common funding is the only kind of contribution that members are required to pour into NATO. For 2017, NATO’s total budget was roughly $2.44 billion. This comprised: a) civil budget for $262 million, which provides funds for personnel expenses, operating costs, and capital and programmed expenditure of the International Staff at NATO Headquarters; b) a military budget, amounting to $1.44 billion, which covers the operating and maintenance costs of the NATO Command Structure (essentially the international military staff and the different strategic commands, and military committees); c) and finally, the NATO Security Investment Program, for a maximum of $734 million, which is to provide major construction and command and control system investments, installations and facilities and so on. In this sense, every NATO member country owes a predetermined share that makes up NATO budget and all countries have regularly paid these mandatory contributions. The US paid $540.32 million, Germany $357.46, France $259.46 and Britain $240.3 million. This also means that on a per capita basis Americans are paying far less than Germans, roughly $1.68 per person for the 2017 NATO budget as opposed to $4.39.

Of course, the commonly funded budget does not include the cost of actually running operations, that is to say the money spent on soldiers, weapons, equipment and other capabilities of each individual country. These are commonly known as indirect costs, but these are entirely up to national states to decide and are not part of NATO budget per se. When the North Atlantic Council (NAC) unanimously decides to engage in an operation, there is no obligation for each and every country to contribute to the operation unless it falls under Article V. In all cases, contributions are
voluntary and vary in form and scale. These voluntary contributions are offered by individual allies and are taken from their overall defense capability to form the combined Alliance capability. But even considering these costs, Trump’s allegation that the US covers “anywhere between 70 and 90 percent” of all NATO costs is blatantly incorrect. It is hard to know where Trump learned this information, but he seems to refer to the fact that the US spends 67% in real terms of what NATO nations combined spend on defense, this amounts to 3.5% circa of its GDP. Clearly, this does not mean that the US covers over 67% of the costs involved in the operational running of NATO as an organization. This simply means that the US spends more than any other NATO member on its own defense, which is entirely unsurprising given the fact that the US is the wealthiest nation in the world, the world’s only superpower, and its military performs a global role.22 Put simply, saying that the US spends $600 billion on defense is not the same as saying that the US spends $600 billion to defend Europe from Russia or to run NATO military operations. As one NATO official simply put it, “because the US has this global reach and global responsibility then of course the military defense expenditures are going to be very different from a country like Slovenia or Luxembourg.”23

There is another possible interpretation to Trump’s accusation that Germany (and others) “owe” money to the United States. Trump might be referring to the fact that Germany like many other countries in Europe (as well as Canada) have not yet met a pledge agreed by Ministers in a North Atlantic Council meeting in Wales back in 2014 according to which NATO member states should increase their defense spending to 2% of their GDP.24 However, the 2% pledge was always intended simply as a political guideline and, at any rate, it was to be reached by 2024—not 2018 [Fig.2]. Furthermore, these increases could not in any way be considered part of the members’ financial obligations and they would only indirectly improve NATO defense capabilities.

To be sure, Trump is not the first president to worry about Europe’s economic competitiveness nor it is the first to claim that European countries should spend more on their own defense. In fact, nearly every president has routinely asked NATO partners to contribute more to the shared burden of NATO’s defense. In the 1950s and 1960s, Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy promoted forms of European military integration to reduce the costs of high US troops commitment in Germany. Both the European Defence Community (EDC) and the Multilateral Force (MLF) projects failed, and both administrations increased their reliance on nuclear weapons as a result. McNamara continued throughout the 1960s to cajole the Europeans to spend more to meet the requirements of his strategy of “flexible response,” to little avail.25 As US defense expenditures skyrocketed during the Vietnam War, President Lyndon Johnson rushed to reach bilateral offset agreements with West Germany to counterbalance the cost of troops deployment. The offset negotiations became throughout the Cold War the main burden-sharing mechanism.26 Under pressure by Senator Mike Mansfield in the early 1970s also President Nixon insisted the allies should do more for their own defense, but unable to coerce the allies into spending more on defense, he continued to rely on offset agreements.27 As the Cold War resurfaced in the late 1970s, President Carter was the first to obtain a pledge from the allies to commit to an yearly increase in defense spending by 3% of GDP after inflation.28 In the mid-1980s, Senator Sam Nunn (D-GA) proposed an amendment that linked the level of US forces in Europe to the meeting of the 3% goal. Thanks to Reagan’s and his Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger’s commitment to a strong military posture the amendment was defeated.29 In 2006, it was George Bush’ turn to snatch from the allies an agreement to spend 2% of
GDP on defense. This commitment was confirmed at the NAC meeting in 2014, and again reaffirmed at the most recent NAC meeting in July 2018.

It is also not the first time the Alliance goes through a period of transatlantic rift. In 1956, the Suez Crisis severely tested diplomatic relations between France and Britain on one side, and the United States on the other. After Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser nationalized and closed the Suez Canal, the two European powers and Israel (the strongest American ally in the region) orchestrated a military intervention aimed at restoring the free passage of the Canal essential to British and French companies’ interests. The United States, concerned by the Soviet threats of nuclear retaliation, strongly denounced the invasion and co-operated with the USSR at the United Nations to put an end to the dispute. France, Britain, and Israel were forced out of Egypt and were replaced by a UN peace-keeping mission.

In the aftermath of the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis and with the signing of the first US-USSR arms control agreement (the 1963 Test Ban Treaty), many questioned whether NATO should continue to exist. At the same time, General Charles had come to the conclusion that in a world in which superpowers could threaten each other with assured destruction, the US could no longer be trusted with the defense of Europe — no American president, he believed, would resort to nuclear weapons to defend Europe knowing that Russia could attack an American city in retaliation. In 1967, the “Harmel Report” closed five years of wrangling on nuclear sharing issues after the failure of the MLF in 1964 and consequent rise of the Gaullist challenge. With the “Harmel Report” NATO finally adopted the new strategy of “flexible response,” but only after France dramatically decided to withdraw from the NATO integrated military structure.

Between 1978 and 1983, it was again nuclear diplomacy that threw NATO in disarray. First the US decision to produce an Enhanced Radiation Weapon (ERW), commonly known as “neutron bomb”, and then the NATO decision to deploy in Europe 572 additional warheads on new generation cruise and ballistic missiles generated unprecedented public outcry. German-American relations in the late 1970s reached a post-war historic low, and Chancellor Schmidt repeatedly questioned President Carter’s leadership. The deployment of the Pershing and cruise missiles proscribed by the 1979 NATO Dual-Track Decision and supervised by the new Reagan administration risked splitting the Alliance and caused the fall of the Schmidt government.

The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War again casted doubts on the raison d’être of the Alliance, but President George Bush was adamant in keeping the organization alive and expanding its role in policing the new unipolar world order he envisioned. The war in Afghanistan seemed to vindicate that decision. For the first time in the aftermath of 9/11 NATO invoked article V and all NATO nations supported the invasion of Afghanistan to fight Al-Qaeda. However, in 2003 President Bush Jr. dragged the Alliance into another crisis, when Germany and France publicly denounced the administration’s decision to subvert Saddam Hussein’s regime. Only Britain’s support to the Iraqi War saved the administration from a complete diplomatic debacle.

Regardless of the merits of the accusations Trump moved against its allies on trade and burden sharing culminating in the July 2018 NAC, the fact of the matter is that no American president had ever used such a confrontational tone against its allies. No American president had ever doubted that Europe would be an ally and not a foe. And, no
American president had ever held increased defense spending as sine qua non for continued US participation to NATO — a serious and unprecedented threat. As European Council Chairman Donald Tusk put it, "With friends like these, who needs enemies." In this sense, while it is true that the burden-sharing dispute is nothing new, this a fundamental crisis like we have never seen before. It is a crisis that puts into question the relevance of the Alliance, that questions whether NATO is still useful to the United States, and even whether the United States and the European Union are friends or foes.

CONCLUSION: LOOKING AHEAD
How Can NATO Overcome this Crisis?

Still, NATO will survive Trump—if anything because Trump does not represent the views of Congress and the US Military Establishment. The foreign policy and military elites are strongly committed to NATO and a change in leadership will most likely reduce transatlantic tension. This is not to say, however, that Europe should simply sit this presidency in and wait for the storm to pass.

Useful lessons about how NATO can survive Trump’s challenge can be learned from historical analogy. NATO has undergone numerous crises, but it survived each time—how? Certainly, during the Cold War it survived because NATO was an essential part of US strategy of Soviet containment, but these rifts were also overcome through small compromise adjustments that increased trust, cooperation, and reinforced deterrence. In 1967, for instance, McNamara decided to create the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) to compensate for the failure of the MLF and to prevent the spread of Gaullist ideas about the unreliability of the US nuclear commitment. It was a small step that however carried important long-term consequences as the NPG became one of the central poles of decision-making in the Alliance. NATO will survive this crisis too, but it will also have to take small and incremental steps in the right direction. For instance, all NATO members and international security experts agree that Canada and Europe should spend more on defense, but their focus on a fixed increase in percentage of GDP is not what NATO needs. Spending should be based on real-world military requirement for defense and deterrence. To this regard, the relevance of the 2% mark is to say the least questionable. NATO should also reach a strategic agreement on what these military capabilities should be. It is true that geopolitical instability is rising, great power rivalry might return as a feature of international relations, and new challenges from non-state actors and new technologies may continue to emerge. But at present, NATO is performing only non-combat training missions in Iraq and Afghanistan, a peace-keeping mission in Kosovo, and a policing mission in the Mediterranean. It also holds a few maritime and air standing forces, including the NATO Response Force (NRF). Most of NATO members participate in and contribute to these missions at varying degrees. It is also clear that the kind of capabilities necessary to perform these roles are not the same needed to fight a war in Europe. It is understandably hard for European democracies to demand massive rearmament efforts — for instance Germany should jump from $40 to $70 billion to meet the 2 percent — at a time of relative peace, even considering recent Russian behavior.
Nonetheless it is part of NATO’s strategic culture to reason in worst-case scenario terms and aim to be prepared for them. The new US strategic posture has identified war among major powers as the number one threat to US security ahead of international terrorism. The US military have no doubt that Russia is once again a very real threat to peace in Europe. “Russia seeks to change the international order, fracture NATO, and undermine US leadership in order to protect its regime, re-assert dominance over its neighbors, and achieve greater influence around the globe,” said Commander of the US European Command (USEUCOM) Curtis M. Scaparrotti in a testimony before Congress. Thus, it is not unsurprising that most NATO members and defense intellectuals on both side of the Atlantic agree that non-US NATO countries should spend more in the medium-term on defense, which in turn should enhance NATO capabilities. It is not entirely clear, however, that this would also in turn reduce US military spending. It is clear instead that placing NATO’s faith in the hands of the 2% goal would be highly unwise.

For instance, Greece makes the cut of the 2% nations but most of its spending is on personnel’s pensions. Furthermore, most of Greek military spending is geared against Turkey, nominally an ally in NATO. France on the other hand contributes with modernized equipment, high level intelligence and routinely contributes high number of troops to NATO combat and non-combat missions but spends only 1.79% of GDP on defense. Without a clear plan on what the spending is for, which country would contribute with what troops, machinery, infrastructure and so on, it is not clear that increasing spending will effectively increase security. To the contrary, the 2% obsession may only worsen NATO’s problem of inefficient spending. The other “bumper sticker” percentage, i.e. 20% on equipment, may seem more concrete. However, this does not again distinguish between what is actually helpful to NATO operations and what instead may turn out to be just heavy subsidizing of domestic industries or ill-advised investments on equipment that is useless for NATO Commands’ purposes. NATO should instead focus on output measurements. Troop contributions as a percentage of active duty forces would be a more obvious measure of how much countries contribute to NATO defense. Increases in readiness and weapons standardization may also contribute to defense much more than any nominal percentage increase. More “soft power” indexes could also be included in measuring contributions. For instance, aid to nations in Africa and the Middle-East may help stabilization and indirectly alleviate terrorism and migratory fluxes.

Finally, the EU should pursue further military integration under the NATO umbrella. If NATO is to survive the next crisis, European nations are to increase their spending in a more efficient manner. This is another historically long-standing issue. France has been leading the way in this regard, calling for a “common intervention force, common defense budget, and a common doctrine for action.” The challenge now is how to implement this aspiration, in other words how to move towards a “Europeanisation” of NATO defense and deterrent capabilities. The PESCO (Permanent Structured Cooperation) initiative signed in November 2017 was an important step to take the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) in that direction. The EU Member States agreed to step up the European Union’s cooperation in security and defense through coordinated investment and development. As the High Representative Federica Mogherini put it, PESCO will push member states to “join forces on a regular basis, to do things together, spend together, invest together, buy together, act together.” In March 2018 the Council selected the first 17 coordinated project funded under PESCO, which include European Medical Command and sharing platforms for
cyber-attacks, to the development of a European Armored Infantry Fighting Vehicle, to be built in Italy, Greece, and Slovakia. Recently, the EU Commission has proposed a €13 billion European Defence Fund to expand the tasks of PESCO to new coordinated projects. Furthermore, nine-member states plus the UK have signed a European Intervention Initiative (EI2) that aims to give concreteness to French President Macron’s vision of a common strategic culture. Although its core function remains unclear, EI2 represents a small step in the direction of EU defense integration and, unlike PESCO, it will prove important to maintain military cooperation alive with the UK after Brexit.45 These initiatives alongside a newly agreed method to measure NATO members’ contributions that reflect output rather than input will be essential albeit small steps to shield NATO from the crisis of the future. These initiatives will also forestall Western and Eastern European security divergences — one of the major unresolved and structural issues within NATO since its expansion eastward. Yet, most importantly they will also prevent further Trump’s criticism regarding burden-sharing.

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Fig. 1: Defence Expenditure as a Share of GDP, 1989-2018 (2010 prices and exchange rates), Source: NATO.

Fig. 2. Defence Expenditure as Share of GDP by NATO Member, 2014 v. 2018 (based on 2010 prices and exchange rate). Source: NATO.
Endnotes


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